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FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1917

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/22894

and
United States Immigration Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was the rating given the Grievant correct and
in accordance with the agreed upon Performance
Standards and appropriate regulations? If not,
what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held in New York City, New York on November
19, 1982, at which time representatives of the American Federation
of Government Employees, Local 1917, hereinafter referred to as
the Union, and of the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service, appeared. All
concerned were offered fully the opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
tor's Oath was waived.

The Arbitra-

A stenographic record was taken and the

Union and the Service filed post-hearing briefs.
Carl I. Johnson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,"
is a Criminal Investigator employed by the Service in the Frauds
Section, Investigation Branch, in the New York City District.

Dur

ing the rating period in issue he also served as First Vice President of the National Immigration and Naturalization Council of the
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO.

Pursuant to

the Civil Service Reform Act and the rules and regulations of the
Office of Personnel Management, all employees of the Service,

-2including the grievant, were rated for job performance for the
period from October 1, 1981 through March 31, 1982.

The grievant

was rated by his supervisor, William Slattery, on seven individual
critical job elements and received ratings of "Fully Successful"
on two elements, "Excellent" on four elements and "Minimally
Satisfactory" on one element.

The grievant received an overall

performance rating of "fully Successful."

The grievant claimed

that his ratings on each individual element, as well as his overall rating were improper.

He appealed to his second line super-

visor, Mr. Rene Albina who affirmed Mr. Slattery's ratings in toto
Thereafter a formal grievance was filed with the District Director
Charles C. Sava who upheld the ratings on the individual job
elements but reduced the grievant's overall performance rating
from "Fully Successful" to "Minimally Satisfactory."

The Service

ultimately denied the grievance and the matter was referred to
arbitration.
The Union requests that this Arbitrator order that the
grievant's overall performance appraisal be upgraded to "Outstanding" or, at the very least, to "Excellent."

The relevant section

of the Administrative Manual provides that in order to receive
either rating, all critical individual job elements must be rated

2
"Excellent" or higher.

However, a careful and thorough review of

1. The Administrative Manual provides that in order for an employe
to receive an overall performance rating of "Fully Successful",
all individual, critical job elements must be rated "Fully Success
ful," or higher. Since grievant was rated as "Minimally Satisfactory" on one such element, Mr. Sava lowered his overall rating.
2. In order to achieve an overall performance rating of "Outstanding," the employee must also demonstrate outstanding performance in
a majority of the critical elements of the position.

-3-

the evidence and argument in this proceeding has persuaded me that
the Union has failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the
grievant's ratings of "Minimally Satisfactory" with respect to job
element (3) or of "Fully Successful" with respect to job element
(1) were improper.

Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide upon

the propriety of the rating for any other individual job element,
as the grievant's request for an upgrading of his overall rating
would be unaffected.

3

As noted above, the grievant was rated as "Minimally Satisfactory" on job element (3) which requires that an employee
"complies with integrity standards, all applicable laws, regulations and instructions government employee standards of conduct."
Appendix I of the Administrative Manual defines a "minimally
Satisfactory" rating as "performance on an individual critical or
non-critical element of the job which merely meets the performance
standards . . . . " The performance standards for this job element
provides:

3. Although Section 17 of the Administrative Manual provides that
"overall performance ratings issued to employees, or the ratings
assigned to the individual elements, are grievable," I note that
all of the uses of the appraisal results, as set forth in Section
20 of the Manual, are keyed to the overall performance rating,
rather than the individual ratings. In addition, the Union's
brief requests, as a remedy, the upgrading of the overall rating.
Parenthetically I feel constrained to add, however, that I
have serious doubts concerning the propriety, and certainly the
advisability of performance ratings which do not specify the
number of times an employee was critically corrected in the perform
ance of certain elements. Similarly, such corrections should be
immediately communicated to the affected employee. Yet, this
latter reservation is not sufficient to change the outcome of
this decision.

-4EXCELLENT - In addition to the "fully successful" standard, incumbent through his actions
creates a positive atmosphere towards compliance
with integrity standards.
FULLY SUCCESSFUL - Maintains high
integrity, honesty, impartiality,
in the performance of his duties.
any action or making any decision
in or creates the appearance of

standards of
and conduct
Avoids taking
which results

a. Using public office for private gain
b. Giving preferential treatment to any
person
c. Impeding Government efficiency or
economy
d. Losing complete independence or impartiality
e. Making a Government decision outside
official channels
f. Abuse of official authority, or,
g. Adversely affecting the confidence
of the public in the integrity of
the Government, reports immediately
allegations of misconduct by other
employees.
MINIMALLY SATISFACTORY - Efforts to maintain the
"fully successful" standard required more than
open support from management officials.
The grievant's rating of "Minimally Satisfactory" was based on the
fact that during the rating period he was suspended for five days
without pay for refusing to cooperate in an official inquiry and
for insubordination.

That suspension was the subject of another

pending arbitration at the time of the hearing in the instant
proceeding.

The Service conceded that the grievant's rating on

this element would be upgraded, if grievance on the suspension was
sustained.

However, on December 3, 1982, Arbitrator Levin found

that the grievant's suspension was "for just and sufficient cause
and for only such reasons as would promote the efficiency of the
Service" and he denied the grievance.
It is well settled that Arbitrator Levin's determination that

-5-

the grievant refused to cooperate in an official inquiry and was
insubordinate should be honored by me, unless I determine that his
decision was palpably wrong.

A review of his opinion and award

has persuaded me it is not palpably wrong.

That is not to say that

I necessarily agree with Arbitrator Levin's decision.

I have only

concluded that I am not free to make a de novo finding on the same
issues.

Since I am bound by the findings that the grievant refused

to cooperate in an official inquiry and was insubordinate, I conclude that his rating of "Minimally Satisfactory" on Job Element
(3) must stand.

The grievant has not met the performance standard

which requires for the next higher rating of "Fully Successful"
that he or she "Maintains high standards of integrity, honesty,
impartiality and conduct in the performance of his duties" and
"avoids taking any action . . . . which results in . . . . impeding
government efficiency and economy . . . ."A rating of "Excellent"
would require satisfaction of the "Fully Successful" standard, as
well as actions creating a positive atmosphere toward compliance
with integrity standards.
The Union's contentions on the rating for Job Element (3)
are unpersuasive.

Although Mr. Slattery's written comments stated

that the grievant did not take any action that "would create an
adverse appearance," this job element, on its face, deals with all
instructions governing employee standards of conduct and not just
those which would create a poor public image for the Service.
Further, the Union's contention that the grievant was suspended as
a "union official," but should be rated only as an "employee"

-6ignores the fact that all employees are required as part of their
duties to cooperate in official inquiries and follow
until and unless they are determined to be wrongfully

instructions
issued.

Although Arbitrator Levin's rational was based, in part, on the
active role played by the grievant in Union decisions, he clearly
recognized that the grievant, as an individual employee, was the
subject of the scheduled interview and was guilty of the discipliary violations previously set forth.

Lastly, rating the grievant

as "Minimally Satisfactory" does not constitute "double punishment
but rather reflects an appropriate appraisal of his performance on
this job element.

4
Lest there by any doubt, I have also concluded that the
Union failed to satisfy its burden of proving that grievant's
rating of "Fully Successful" on Job Element (1) was improper.

To

receive a higher rating of "Excellent," performance standard (b)
requires that an employee manage investigations so that he or she
completes 4.0 - 5.0 cases per month with less than 10% rejected
for informational deficiencies.

The parties have stipulated that

the grievant closed seven cases over the six month period for an
average of 1.166 case closings per month.

The Union contends,

however, that the case closing requirements for ratings on Job
Element (1) must be reduced to take account of the fact that the
grievant, as a Union official, spent a substantial amount of

4. As I have denied this grievance with respect to the rating for
Job Element (3), grievant's overall performance rating of "Minimally Satisfactory" must stand. The Administrative Manual requires
that for an employee to receive an overall performance rating of
"Fully Successful," all critical elements must be rated "Fully
Successful" or higher. In any event, grievant has not sought that
upgrade as a remedy.
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authorized time on official Union business.

The Union relies

specifically on an agreed upon award in another arbitration between the parties which provided:
" All employees must be rated exclusively
in the actual time spent in the work activity. Approved time away from the activity
must not be considered in any performance
rating. All standards must be equaled to
the percentage of time in the work activity."
Although I agree with the Union's contention that this award mandates that the case closing requirements of the rating for this
job element must be prorated, the application of that principle to
the facts of the instant proceeding demonstrates that the grievant
rating of "Fully Successful" was proper.
The parties have stipulated that during the rating period
the grievant spent 431 hours of his total time of 1070 hours on
non-union, non-leave matters.

Thus, the grievant spent 40.28% of

his total time on Fraud, GIN, Litigation and Surveys.

If one pro-

rates the 4.0 - 5.0 case closings per month generally required for
a rating of "Excellent," the grievant should have closed between
1.611 to 2.014 cases per month to receive that rating.

Indeed,

the grievant's average of 1.166 cases per month would fall below

5
the prorated equivalent required for a "Fully Successful" rating.
The Union's argument that Litigation time and Survey time should

5. Thus, the grievant's rating of "Fully Successful on this
element is proper even though his average hours required to
complete cases is at least in the "Excellent" range.

-8also be 'excluded' in computing required case closing is unconvincing in light of Mr. Albina's clear and uncontradicted testimon
that cases can be and are often closed during such time.

Indeed,

the grievant conceded on cross-examination that it was possible
to close cases during litigation time.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The rating given Carl I. Johnson was in
accordance with the agreed upon Performance Standards and appropriate regulations.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 18, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1917

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/22894

and

United States Immigration Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was the rating given the Grievant correct and
in accordance with the agreed upon Performance
Standards and appropriate regulations?
If not,
what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held in New York City, New York on November
19, 1982, at which time representatives of the American Federation |
of Government Employees, Local 1917, hereinafter referred to as
the Union, and of the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service, hereinafter referred to as the Service, appeared.

All

concerned were offered fully the opportunity to offer evidence and j
I
i
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitra- i
tor's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was taken and the

Union and the Service filed post-hearing briefs.
Carl I. Johnson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,"
i

is a Criminal Investigator employed by the Service in the Frauds
Section, Investigation Branch, in the New York City District.

Dur-

ing the rating period in issue he also served as First Vice Presi-

.i

dent of the National Immigration and Naturalization Council of the
i

''American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO.

ij

Pursuant to

the Civil Service Reform Act and the rules and regulations of the

!|
! Office of Personnel Management, all employees of the Service,

;
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including the grievant, were rated for job performance for the
I

period from October 1, 1981 through March 31, 1982.

The grievant

I
was rated by his supervisor, William Slattery, on seven individual!,
j
critical job elements and received ratings of "Fully Successful" ]
on two elements, "Excellent" on four elements and "Minimally
Satisfactory" on one element.

The grievant received an overall

performance rating of "fully Successful."

The grievant claimed

that his ratings on each individual element, as well as his overall rating were improper.

He appealed to his second line super-

visor, Mr. Rene Albina who affirmed Mr. Slattery's ratings in toto,
Thereafter a formal grievance was filed with the District Directorj
Charles C. Sava who upheld the ratings on the individual job

i
elements but reduced the grievant's overall performance rating
1
i
from "Fully Successful" to "Minimally Satisfactory." The Service
ultimately denied the grievance and the matter was referred to
arbitration.
The Union requests that this Arbitrator order that the
grievant's overall performance appraisal be upgraded to "Outstanding" or, at the very least, to "Excellent."

The relevant section

of the Administrative Manual provides that in order to receive
either rating, all critical individual job elements must be rated
2
"Excellent" or higher. However, a careful and thorough review of
1. The Administrative Manual provides that in order for an employee
to receive an overall performance rating of "Fully Successful",
all individual, critical job elements must be rated "Fully Successful," or higher. Since grievant was rated as "Minimally Satisfactory" on one such element, Mr. Sava lowered his overall rating.
I

2. In order to achieve an overall performance rating of "Outstanding," the employee must also demonstrate outstanding performance in
a majority of the critical elements of the position.
j

-3the evidence and argument in this proceeding has persuaded me that
| the Union has failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the
grievant's ratings of "Minimally Satisfactory" with respect to job
element (3) or of "Fully Successful" with respect to job element
(1) were improper.

Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide upon

the propriety of the rating for any other individual job element,
as the grievant's request for an upgrading of his overall rating
would be unaffected.

3

As noted above, the grievant was rated as "Minimally Satisfactory" on job element (3) which requires that an employee
"complies with integrity standards, all applicable laws, regulations and instructions government employee standards of conduct."
Appendix I of the Administrative Manual defines a "minimally
Satisfactory" rating as "performance on an individual critical or
non-critical element of the job which merely meets the performance
standards . . . . " The performance standards for this job element
provides:

3. Although Section 17 of the Administrative Manual provides that:
"overall performance ratings issued to employees, or the ratings
assigned to the individual elements, are grievable," I note that
all of the uses of the appraisal results, as set forth in Section
20 of the Manual, are keyed to the overall performance rating,
|
rather than the individual ratings. In addition, the Union's
brief requests, as a remedy, the upgrading of the overall rating.
Parenthetically I feel constrained to add, however, that I
have serious doubts concerning the propriety, and certainly the
advisability of performance ratings which do not specify the
number of times an employee was critically corrected in the perform
ance of certain elements. Similarly, such corrections should be :
immediately communicated to the affected employee. Yet, this
latter reservation is not sufficient to change the outcome of
this decision.

-4EXCELLENT - In addition to the "fully successful" standard, incumbent through his actions
creates a positive atmosphere towards compliance
with integrity standards.
FULLY SUCCESSFUL - Maintains high
integrity, honesty, impartiality,
in the performance of his duties.
any action or making any decision
in or creates the appearance of

standards of
and conduct
Avoids taking
which results

a. Using public office for private gain
b. Giving preferential treatment to any
person
c. Impeding Government efficiency or
economy
d. Losing complete independence or impartiality
e. Making a Government decision outside
official channels
f. Abuse of official authority, or,
g. Adversely affecting the confidence
of the public in the integrity of
the Government, reports immediately
allegations of misconduct by other
employees.
MINIMALLY SATISFACTORY - Efforts to maintain the
"fully successful" standard required more than
open support from management officials.
The grievant's rating of "Minimally Satisfactory" was based on the
fact that during the rating period he was suspended for five days
without pay for refusing to cooperate in an official inquiry and
for insubordination.

That suspension was the subject of another

pending arbitration at the time of the hearing in the instant
proceeding.

The Service conceded that the grievant's rating on

this element would be upgraded, if grievance on the suspension was
sustained.

However, on December 3, 1982, Arbitrator Levin found

;j that the grievant's suspension was "for just and sufficient cause
jj
i
!J and for only such reasons as would promote the efficiency of the
i
i

Service" and he denied the grievance.
It is well settled that Arbitrator Levin's determination that

-5the grievant refused to cooperate in an official inquiry and was
insubordinate should be honored by me, unless I determine that his
decision was palpably wrong.

A review of his opinion and award

has persuaded me it is not palpably wrong.

|
That is not to say that

I necessarily agree with Arbitrator Levin's decision.

I have only

concluded that I am not free to make a de novo finding on the same
I
!

issues.

Since I am bound by the findings that the grievant refused)

to cooperate in an official inquiry and was insubordinate, I conclude that his rating of "Minimally Satisfactory" on Job Element
(3) must stand.

The grievant has not met the performance standard

which requires for the next higher rating of "Fully Successful"
that he or she "Maintains high standards of integrity, honesty,
impartiality and conduct in the performance of his duties" and
"avoids taking any action . . . . which results in . . . .

impedin

government efficiency and economy . . . ."A rating of "Excellent"
would require satisfaction of the "Fully Successful" standard, as
well as actions creating a positive atmosphere toward compliance
with integrity standards.
The Union's contentions on the rating for Job Element (3)
are unpersuasive.

Although Mr. Slattery's written comments stated

that the grievant did not take any action that "would create an
adverse appearance," this job element, on its face, deals with all
instructions governing employee standards of conduct and not just
those which would create a poor public image for the Service.
Further, the Union's contention that the grievant was suspended as
I a "union official," but should be rated only as an "employee"

-6ignores the fact that all employees are required as part of their
duties to cooperate in official inquiries and follow
until and unless they are determined to be wrongfully

instructions
issued.

Although Arbitrator Levin's rational was based, in part, on the
active role played by the grievant in Union decisions, he clearly \
recognized that the grievant, as an individual employee, was the

|

subject of the scheduled interview and was guilty of the discipliary violations previously set forth.

Lastly, rating the grievant

j
,:,
as "Minimally Satisfactory" does not constitute "double punishment"
but rather reflects an appropriate appraisal of his performance on
this job element.

4
Lest there by any doubt, I have also concluded that the
Union failed to satisfy its burden of proving that grievant's
rating of "Fully Successful" on Job Element (1) was improper.

To

receive a higher rating of "Excellent," performance standard (b)
requires that an employee manage investigations

so that he or she

completes 4.0 - 5.0 cases per month with less than 1070 rejected
for informational deficiencies.

The parties have stipulated that
t

the grievant closed seven cases over the six month period for an
average of 1.166 case closings per month.

The Union contends,

however, that the case closing requirements for ratings on Job
Element (1) must be reduced to take account of the fact that the
grievant, as a Union official, spent a substantial amount of

4. As I have denied this grievance with respect to the rating for
Job Element (3), grievant's overall performance rating of "Minimally Satisfactory" must stand. The Administrative Manual requires
that for an employee to receive an overall performance rating of
"Fully Successful," all critical elements must be rated "Fully
Successful" or higher. In any event, grievant has not sought that
upgrade as a remedy.

-7!
authorized time on official Union business.

The Union relies

specifically on an agreed upon award in another arbitration between the parties which provided:
" All employees must be rated exclusively
in the actual time spent in the work activity. Approved time away from the activity
must not be considered in any performance
rating. All standards must be equaled to
the percentage of time in the work activity."
Although I agree with the Union's contention that this award mandates that the case closing requirements of the rating for this
job element must be prorated, the application of that principle to

j
the facts of the instant proceeding demonstrates that the grievant(s
rating of "Fully Successful" was proper.
The parties have stipulated that during the rating period
the grievant spent 431 hours of his total time of 1070 hours on

non-union, non-leave matters.

Thus, the grievant spent 40.28% of ;
I

his total time on Fraud, GIN, Litigation and Surveys.

If one pro-j
I
rates the 4.0 - 5.0 case closings per month generally required for^
1
a rating of "Excellent," the grievant should have closed between
1.611 to 2.014 cases per month to receive that rating.

Indeed,

the grievant's average of 1.166 cases per month would fall below

5
the prorated equivalent required for a "Fully Successful" rating. !
!

The Union's argument that Litigation time and Survey time should

I 5. Thus, the grievant's rating of "Fully Successful on this
I element is proper even though his average hours required to
complete cases is at least in the "Excellent" range.
;

-8also be 'excluded' in computing required case closing is unconvincing in light of Mr. Albina's clear and uncontradicted testimony
that cases can be and are often closed during such time.

Indeed,

the grievant conceded on cross-examination that it was possible
to close cases during litigation time.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The rating given Carl I. Johnson was in
accordance with the agreed upon Performance Standards and appropriate regulations.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 18, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
The American Association of University
Professors, University of Connecticut
Chapter

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 39 0275 77

and
The University of Connecticut

In accordance with Article 10 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1979 between the
University of Connecticut, hereinafter referred to as the
"University" and the American Association of University Professors
the University of Connecticut chapter, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union", the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide a dispute involving the Union's grievance dated
November 29, 1977 and amended December 19, 1977.
The present issue is whether the grievance is arbitrable.
A hearing was held at the offices of the University on
January 23, 1978 at which time representatives of the Union and
University appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post hearing

briefs.

i

.
The Union's grievance, filed on November 29, 1977 and amended
on December 19, 1977 claims violations of Article 19.2 and 19.4

-2-

of the collective bargaining agreement by the University's action
in prorating the cost of living adjustment and merit/inequity
awards for those members of the bargaining unit employed less than
full time.

On both November 29 and December 19 the Union referred

to its grievance as a "class action."
At the hearing the Union conceded that the grievance had
not been filed by any individual or group members of the bargaining unit and that no bargaining unit faculty members employed less
than full time had complained over how the University apportioned
the disputed wage adjustments.

With that concession the Union

asked that the Arbitrator treat its grievance as a "Union grievance" in accordance with Section 10.11.6 of the contract which
provides inter alia that "the AAUP on behalf of itself may initiate
any contractual grievance...."
The University contends that the grievance is not arbitrable
because there are no bargaining unit grievants to support the
"class action" and the Union should not now be permitted to change
its pleading; that the grievance was not filed within 37 days of
the occurrence of the conditions giving rise thereto, but rather
121 days after the prorated wage adjustments were implemented in
the pay checks of the affected employees.

The University points

out that the less than full time members of the faculty received
the disputed wage adjustments on a pro rata basis on July 29, 1977
'
that the Union's grievance was not filed until 121 days later on
November 29, 1977; and that Section 10.11.1 of the grievance

-3-

procedure of the contract explicitly provides that a grievance
"shall not....be considered a grievance under this Agreement"
if it is not presented for disposition within the time limits
prescribed therein.
The Union asserts that the time limits set forth in Section
10.11.1 of the contract should begin to run only after the Union
knew or had grounds to know of the occurrence of the condition
giving rise to the grievance; that because no affected faculty
member complained the Union did not immediately learn of the prorated wage adjustments for those working less than full time;
that irrespective of the absence of individual or group grievants
the Union has a contractual right, as an entity, to grieve contract violations; that the University's letters to the affected
faculty members were ambiguous and misleading and that other payroll information sought by the Union from the University was incomplete, misleading, not sufficiently revealing and/or not trans
mitted on time and consequently not informative of the problem.
The Union explains that when it learned of the circumstances it
quickly grieved and that its grievance met the contractual time
limits if measured from the point that it learned how the University apportioned the wage adjustments to the less than full time
faculty.

Alternatively the Union characterizes its complaint as

a "continuing grievance", asserting that it is arbitrable from
and after any point that the affected employees receive any pay
check with less than the amount of wages prescribed by Sections
19.2 and 19.4 of the contract.

-4I reject the University's theory that the grievance should
be dismissed because it was filed and amended as a "class action'
when in fact there are no individual or group grievants.

Arbitra-

tion is not bound by the rigid rules of hisorical common law
pleading.

Obviously the Union erred in its belief that a "Union

grievance" was a "class action."

But inasmuch as the contract

permits the Union to grieve as an entity, whether or not there
are individual grievants supportive of the grievance, the Union
has the right in this

instant proceeding to procedurally change

its "class action" grievance to a grievance "on behalf of itself
in accordance with the contractual authority of Section 10.11.6.
However, for several reasons I find that the Union's
grievance is untimely and barred from arbitration by the time
limits of Section 10.11.1 of the contract.
As the parties know the Arbitrator's authority is limited
to the application and interpretation of the contract.

Indeed

Section 10.9 of the contract cautions the Arbitrator not to "add
to, subtract from, modify or alter the terms and provisions of
this Agreement."

Therefore, unless there has been an explicit

waiver, a waiver by past practice or conduct, or special circumstances which suspend or toll them, the time limits for filing
grievances, as negotiated by the parties as an integral part of
the grievance machinery of the contract, must be adhered to and
enforced.

Neither in this case nor by practice in prior grievances

is there any evidence of the University's agreement to waive the
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time limits of Section 10.11.1. of the contract, nor has there
been any practice or conduct from which waiver can be implied.
The question therefore narrows to whether because of
special circumstances running of the time limit should be tolled
from the date that the affected employees first received prorated
wage adjustments in their pay envelopes (on July 29, 1977) until
some time shortly before the grievance was filed, when, as the
Union contends, it first learned of what it considered to be
violations of Sections 19.2 and 19.4 of the contract; and
alternately whether the grievance is a "continuing" one thereby
permitting a prospective grievance any time after the affected
employees receive any pay check with less pay than the Union
believes to be their entitlement under those Sections of the
contract.
I answer the latter point first.
grievance."

This is not a "continuing

The University acted once.

It made a decision that

bargaining unit faculty members employed less than full time
would receive a prorated share of the wage adjustments, commensurate with the percentage of time

they worked.

made no further decisions in that regard.

Thereafter it

The pay checks of the

affected employees on and after July 29, 1977 reflected that
basic and single decision.

A "continuing grievance" requires a

reiteration and renewal of the original decision or the implementation of a new decision having the same or similar adverse
effect.

A periodic reoccurrence of an event or situation rootec

-6-

in a single managerial determination is not a continuing grievance,
but rather, within the language of Section 10.11.1 of the contract
nothing more than a perpetuation of and synonymous with the original
"occurrence or condition."
The instance case is no more a "continuous grievance" than a
discharge, where an employer takes a single action terminating an
employee, and the affected worker remains unemployed through a
series of pay periods until his grievance is heard.

Clearly, a

time limit on filing that grievance is binding from the date of
discharge, and may not be filed long after a time limit has expired
merely because the grievant is "continuously" off the payroll, and
even if his termination was without cause.

Similarly here, the

time limit on grievances concedely applicable to Union grievances
as well as those of individuals or groups, relates to the University's single action in prorating the disputed wage adjustments,
and not to each periodic pay check thereafter.
Based on the record before me I cannot conclude that the Union
should be excused from the running time limits, or that the time
should have tolled because of the Union's allegation that it did
not and could not learn of the condition giving rise to its
grievance until well past the expiration of the contract time limit
Aside from negotiating conditions of employment, a Union's next
most important function is to police the administration of the
collective agreement.

In that latter regard there is no more

important duty than to see to it that negotiated wage adjustments

-7-

are properly implemented and paid.

In discharging that duty, the

Union must assume the initiative, act diligently and seek information from its members as well as from the employer.

In the instan

case, the Union's responsibility in that regard is heightened by t
explicit contract provision permitting the Union to grieve "on behalf of itself" regardless of whether there are member complainants
With that right (not usually so spelled out in contracts), the
Union cannot wait until its members inform it of grievances, and
cannot avoid time limits on "Union grievances" because individuals
do not protest.

Rather, in possessing that right the Union has

the corresponding duty to ascertain the existence of grievances on
its own initiative and investigation, including, in the instant
case, an inquiry among its members on what amount of wage increase
they received, with available payroll stub documentation.

I con-

clude the Union could have and should have done so within the prescribed time limits.
If the print out sheets, payroll information and other
relevant data requested of the University was willfully misleading
or negligently incomplete, inaccurate or withheld, I would be inclined to treat that as an acceptable excuse from the application
of the time limits of Section 10.11.1.

The Union makes that claim

herein, but it has not been proved, at least not to that requisite
level. The evidence regarding their content, interpretation, when
supplied, etc., is sharply contradictory and disputed.

From it I

cannot find that the University misled the Union, or withheld

-8relevant information, or supplied information that was prejudicially
incomplete or inaccurate.

That the Union may have had to make

interpretations and mathematical calculations therefrom, or that
the data was not completely clear, does not mean that it was incorrect, misleading, or inadequate, let alone deceptive.
Moreover, I am not satisfied that the remedy the Union seeks
is arbitrable.

The grievance asks for pay adjustments for the les

than full time faculty.

In other words, if the Union prevailed

on the merits, certain individual employees would receive upward
wage adjustments, even though those employees had not grieved,
and as individuals or as a group are now (and at the time of the
Union's grievance) time barred from seeking such a remedy under
the time limits of Section 10.11.1 of the contract.

It is axio-

matic that a result may not be achieved indirectly if it is not
permitted directly.

If the affected employees are now time barred

from a wage adjustment, the Union, in a "grievance on its own behalf" should not be permitted to gain for them what they are foreclosed from gaining for themselves.

Otherwise, the express time

limits of the contract, as negotiated by the parties would be
circumvented and reduced to a nullity.

Consequently, the remedy

available to the Union in a grievance on its own behalf must be a
remedy "indigenous" to the Union as an entity, not a remedy proscribed for its members.

In my view it is questionable whether

the Union has been monetarily damaged, assuming an error by the
University in prorating the wage increase for part time faculty.

-9As an entity, the calculable damage to the Union is only nominal.
Its grievance on the merits if it prevailed, would entitle it to
a bare ruling that the contract had been

violated and an award

of nominal damages, leaving the contractually barred remedy for
the affected employees a matter for negotiations, not arbitration.
In sum, as the contract time bars the remedy sought to
individual grievants, an arbitration of a "union grievance" seeking
the same remedy is similarly enjoined.
Finally, lest the Union think that on technical grounds it
has been denied its "day in court" on the merits of its grievance,
this Arbitrator, having learned the substantive aspects of the
grievance in the presentation of the arbitrability case, takes the
unprecedented step of stating that he would not have upheld it
on the merits.

The "base salary: and "salaries" referred to in

Sections 19.2 and 19.4 of the contract I interpret to mean "full
time salary."

Hence a covered employee working less than full

time, draws, during his less than full time tenure, only a portion
of "base salary."

A negotiated wage adjustment, applicable to

"base rate" or full time salary is therefore prorated for those
working less than full time and receiving proportionately less
than full time pay. (When they assume or resume a full time work
schedule they would then receive the full wage increase applicable
to their full time status and full time base salary.) I believe
the wages and pay for less than full time employees involved in
this case met that test.

-10Accordingly, the Undersigned, cfuly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance dated November 29, 1977 and
amended December 19, 1977 is not arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 28, 1978
STATE OF New York ) ^ .
CITY OF New York
)'"
On this twenty eighth day of March, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1139 0211 82

MSP/FSU/MTA/NEA

and
University of Massachusetts

The stipulated issue is:
"Did the University violate Articles 11 and
13 of the collective bargaining agreement
by the manner in which the Provost reversed
the original faculty recommendation, thereby denying tenure to Dr. Anne Mochon? If
so, what shall be the remedy pursuant to the
contract?"
Hearings were held in Amherst, Massachusetts on October
25, 1982, January 13, 1983 and February 24, 1983 at which times
Dr. Mochon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and
representatives of the above named Union and University appeared„
All concerned were offered fully the opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A steno-

graphic record was taken and the Union and the University filed
post-hearing briefs.

The parties waived any requirement of the

Arbitrator's Oath.
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
The relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the University provide in pertinent
part:
ARTICLE XI
11.1 The Faculty shall have primary responsibility in the area of personnel matters.
This shall mean the capacity to initiate

-2or review faculty personnel recommendations. Academic administrative officials
may make a recommendation or decision
counter to the original faculty recommendation only in exceptional circumstances
and with compelling reasons in written
detail which shall specifically address
the content of that recommendation as well
as the established standards and criteria.
11.2 The faculty shall have the right to grieve
based upon the terms and conditions of
this Agreement any modification or reversal
of such recommendations.
ARTICLE XIII
13.1 High professional standards must be the
basis for all personnel decisions. Personnel
recommendations and decisions shall be made
only after a review of all of the qualifications and all the contributions of the individual in the areas of teaching, or research,
creative or professional activity, and of
service. All three areas must be considered
but the relative weight to be given to each
may be determined in the light of the duties
of the faculty member.
13.2 In order to maintain the academic excellence
of the University, current academic standards
and criteria for faculty personnel actions,
except as modified in this agreement, shall
remain in effect for the duration of the
contract.
FACTS
The grievant is an art historian who was first appointed
by the University in 1971 as an Instructor in the Art Department0
She received her doctorate degree from Yale University in 1973
and the next year she was promoted to the rank of Assistant
Professor.

The grievant was subject to the University's tenure

review process during the 1980-1981 academic year. Pursuant to
Article 13.1 of the collective bargaining agreement, that process
requires review of a tenure candidate's performance in the areas

-3of: teaching; service;and, "research, creative or professional
activities." The parties have agreed that to receive tenure,
Section 4.9 of the Academic Personnel Policy requires that a
candidate must have "convincing evidence of excellence in at
least two, and strength in the third, of the areas...." and
"reasonable assurance of continuing development and achievement
leading to further contributions to the University."
On November 17, 1980, the Art History faculty recommended
by a vote of 8-0 with no abstentions

in favor of awarding the

grievant tenute and promoting her to Associate Professor.

The

Committee found that the grievant's teaching and service were
"uniformly excellent" and that her research showed "genuine
strength as well as potential." With respect to research, the
Art History faculty stated:
"Anne Mochon's position in the Department,
as a historian of the art of the immediate
present, as a scholar interested in ideas
on the cutting edge of art-historical
developments, and as a colleague who therefore in many ways stands between the academic
world of the art historian and the creative
world of the studio artist, has influenced
her scholarly output in many ways. Her exhibitions at the University Gallery, her active
participation in symposia of various sorts on
both the local, regional and national levels,
her dissertation on the German plein-air painting and her excellent catalogue of the important Gabriele Munter exhibition at Harvard and
Princeton attest to the care and meticulousness
of her scholarly work. These things also show
the variety of directions which her research
and thinking have taken, to some extent in
response to the contemporary scene. And they
attest to the reputation she has attained beyond the University in her chosen field, as
several of the letters make clear.
Her work on the Munter exhibition demonstrates

-4the appeal and accomplishment of her scholarship. Her repeated trips to Germany and subsequent careful development of her ideas and
approaches have led to a publication of great
quality, "consonant with the best being done
by young American scholars in the field tody"
(Donald E. Gordon letter.) The Munter show,
small and extremely astute, is the finest piece
of work we know of for giving one a revealing
and moving image of what it was like to be a
woman's artist in the early 20th century.
"Certainly the best study of the artist's work
in English (Franciscono letter) and "a really
first-rate monograph" (Herbert letter),-^ it
integrates biography and artist production in
a particularly illuminating way.
Even before its consumation, the wide ranging
importance of this exhibition and catalogue
was demonstrated; it received two grants from
the National Endowment for the Arts and both
Harvard and Princeton, two of the most discerning museums in academic contexts, chose to
display it. It has, in Professor Haxthausen's
words, "established her without question as one
of the brightest young scholars in a field in
which there is a rapidly growing interest."
Professor Mochon has several options for her
future development some stemming from her
dissertation. These will no doubt build upon
"the major contribution (she has now made) to
the fields of early 20th-century European art,
German Expressionism and....women's studies"
(Oppler letter).5

1.

Donald E. Gordon is a Professor of Fine Arts at the University
of Pittsburgh.

2.

Marcel Franciscono is an Associate Professor of Art History
at the University of Illinois.

3.

Robert L. Herbert is the Robert Lehman Professor of the
History of Art at Yale University.

4.

Charles W. Haxthausen is Associate Curator and Associate
Professor of Fine Arts at the Busch-Reisinger Museum at
Harvard University.

5.

Ellen C. Oppler is an Associate Professor in the Department
of Fine Art Studies in Art History and Music History at
Syracuse University.

-5By the Munter catalogue Anne Mochon has amply
justified the faith of the German scholars
who first asked her to undertake this project.
She has proven her ability to bring to fruition
a lengthy and major project, resulting in a
publication of the highest scholarly standing.
In addition, this project represents a significant
departure from the work of her dissertation; it
clearly demonstrates Professor Mochon's ability
as a creative scholar to move beyond the perameters (sic) established during her graduate
education. We commend her creativity and
independence and believe along with Professors
Gordon and Oppler and Comini° that she would
secure tenure at any institution where "scholarship in twentieth century German art is respected.'
On November 21, 1980, George M. Wardlaw, the
Chairman of the Department of Art, extended his
"strongest possible support" to the grievant's
candidacy for tenure and promotion. He stated
in part:
"Dr. Mochon's organization of the Gabriele
Munter retrospective exhibition was an
impressive undertaking. Her sixty-four
page catalogue which accompanies the show
is extremely well written and beautifully
presented. The text is interesting, penetrating and informative.
I am especially
impressed with the quality of research and
the format. This endeavor makes a valuable
contribution in presenting this important
artist to the art community of this country.
Dr. Mochon's work will certainly help bring
attention to this artist, attention that is
most deserved and long overdue."
On November 24, 1980, the Art Department Personnel
Committee also unanimously recommended that the
grievant be awarded tenure and promotion. Their
report stated in pertinent part.

6.

Alessandra Comini is a Professor of Art History at Southern
Methodist University.

7.

This quote is from the Gordon letter.

-6"it is significant to emphasize that every
outside letter recognizes the fine quality
of her scholarship, her vast knowledge of
the contemporary field and her scrupulous
integrity and devotion to her subject. One
reference distinguishes her work as competitive with older established scholars in the
discipline, while another cites her as a
principle research source in 20th century
European art."
On December 16, 1980 the Personnel Committee of the Faculty
of Humanities and Fine Arts unanimously

recommended to Dean Allen

that the grievant be awarded tenure and promotion.

The Committee

agreed with the reasons set forth in the prior recommendations
and further stated that it was impressed by "her publication
record, especially by her catalogue on Gabriele Munter, in the
Committee's view, a gem of Art History scholarship on this
important German woman painter."

The Committee also noted the

"large organizational undertaking" involved in the Munter exhibition at Harvard.
On January 14, 1981, Dean Allen, after "careful reflection,"
also recommended tenure and promotion to Provost Loren Baritz.
With respect to "research/scholarship," Dean Allen stated:
"The most difficult issue in this decision is
the research/scholarship component of Dr.
Mochon's achievement. As several of the outside evaluators mention, her publications to
date are not numerous. There are, however,
factors which counterbalance this quantitative
limitation. First, as several of the outside
reviewers mention, is the excellence of the
work she has published, specifically the Munter
catalogue. This production is widely and discerningly praised by those who have read it.
As one external reviewer put it, "better one
impressive publication of real value to the
field -- as in the Munter catalogue -- than the
buckshot approach.... appearing in article after
article format." In the second place, the Munter

-7exhibition and catalogue are not based on
Dr. Mochon's dissertation; they represent
a new independent line of research for her.
These two factors, combined with her colleague's opinions have persuaded me (and I
am sure, the Faculty Personnel Committee)
to agree with the assessment that Dr. Mochon
is a serious, meticulous, committed scholar;
who works very hard at her research and who
therefore produces and will continue to produce work that will make up in quality what
it may lack in quantity. She worked on the
Munter project since at least as early as
1977, when she first delivered a paper on
Gabriele Munter, stayed with it right up
through 1980, and brought the work to fruition
when the catalogue text appeared. This is
not the pattern typical of the so-called pretenure spurt, which would much more likely
have manifested itself by a quick mining of
her dissertation for a clutch of articles.
It is, rather the pattern one would expect
from a dedicated scholar who cares enough
about her subject to work at it over an extended period of years so as to produce a
work that has real impact.
For the foregoing reasons, plus such other
evidence as the fact that she has been awarded
two NEH grants (substantial confirmation that
external referees expect her achievements), I
conclude that Dr. Mochon has demonstrated the
requisite strength in research, which together
with her clear excellence in teaching and
service, means that she meets the criteria for
the award of tenure as set forth in Section
4.9 of the Academic Personnel Policy (T76-081)."
On March 3, 1981, Provost Baritz wrote to Dean Allen,
stating:
"Pursuant to 6.4 (g) , I invite you to provide
additional information for the basic file which
will clarify your judgment that Professor Mochon
has demonstrated the required strength in scholarly research that qualifies her for tenure and
promotion. Please forward such information to
my office no later than March 10, 1981.
Your
Response may include analysis of the relative
merits of the journals in which Professor Mochon
has published, reviews, the published material,
internal or external analyses of the material

-8and whatever else you may wish to include
that will aid me in determining my recommendation to the Chancellor."
Although Dean Allen requested that the
deadline be extended until April 1, 1981,
the Provost agreed only to an extension
until March 20, 1981, stating that the
former date would be "too late a date for
those materials to aid me in formulating
my recommendation to the Chancellor."
On March 20, 1981, Dean Allen forwarded additional material
to the Provost.

In the accompanying memorandum, the Dean empha-

sized that portions of a March 18, 1981 memorandum from the Art
History faculty which focused on "other evidence of the strength
of Dr. Mochon's scholarly research" such as: (1) a proposal for
a College of Art Association talk which was reviewed and accepted;
(2) her proposals for two NEA grants which were refereed and
approved and, (3) the Munter exhibition itself, which entailed a
great deal of research and critical judgment.

The Dean also for-

warded five additional letters from outside evaluators, all of
which praised the Munter catalogue and the exhibition and two of
which praised the grievant's participation in the accompanying
symposia.

Dean Allen also forwarded the grievant's application

8. Section 6.4 (g) of the Academic Personnel Policy provides:
"Prior to a recommendation or decision that may be contrary to
either the recommendation prepared at the school or college level,
the Chancellor or Provost shall invite the Dean to provide additional information for the basic file on clarification of the
recommendation."
9. However, the Provost did not write his decision on this
matter until May 21, 1981.

-9for a sabbatical leave and the description contained therein of
a proposed research project.

The Dean concluded that the request

for a leave and the proposal was "additional evidence that
Professor Mochon will continue to pursue her scholarly research
on a high level." He concluded:
"She has demonstrated the strength in scholarly
research necessary to justify the award of
tenure. Granted, this is a difficult case to
judge, because the pattern of Professor Mochon's
achievement is unusual, it therefore requires
(and is receiving) more careful scrutiny than a
more conventional case. But it is not a weak
case; and the more closely it is examined, the
more clearly its strength appears."
On May 21, 1981, the Provost ° informed Dean Allen that he
was recommending against awarding tenure to the grievant.

Accord-

ingly, he requested that the grievant be notified that her appoint
ment would terminate as of August 31, 1982.

The Provost's deter-

mination was based on his conclusion that "convincing evidence of
strength in the area of research, creative or professional activit
has not been presented."

More specifically, the Provost noted

that even in Art History, it is usual to make a judgment in this
area by examining the publications that have resulted. Thus, he
asserted that the "primary evidence" of research and scholarship
was the single publication of the Munter exhibition catalogue.
He stated "The question we must confront is whether this single
10. The memorandum was also signed by the Chancellor, but it is
conceded that the decision was actually made by the Provost.
11. The Provost and the University have conceded that the
grievant's performance in the areas of teaching and service was
properly evaluated as excellent.

-10exhibition catalogue provides convincing evidence of strength in
the area of research, creation, professional activity for a
period of eight years.

Although the Provost conceded that in

Art History an exhibition catalogue is a "respectable vehicle for
scholarly effort" he determined that, without "resting

(his)

conclusion on a quantative basis, it is obvious that a single,
relatively short catalogue produced in the course of a decade
does not lead to an acceptable prediction for the future."

He

further stated that his conclusion was based, "in part, on our own
careful study of the catalogue plus a close reading of the letters
of recommendations" which were noted in the November 17 memorandum
from the Art Department Personnel Committee.

17

Based upon some of

the language in three of those letters which alluded to the limit10

ed quantity of published works, ° the Provost concluded that the
grievant's peers do not see her scholarly record as constituting
strength.
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
THE UNION
The Union contends that the Provost and thereby the
University violated Article 11 and Article 13 of the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties in the manner in which

12. The Provost's memo of May 21 made no specific reference to
the evaluations of the catalogue made by the University's own
faculty or to outside recommendations other than those noted in
the November 17 memorandum.
13. The contents of these letters (from Professors Comini,
Franciscono and Herbert) and letters from other outside evaluators
are discussed in the November 17 memorandum from the Art History
faculty and are analyzed in greater detail later in this Opinion.

-11he reversed the affirmative faculty tenure recommendations in
favor of the grievant.

First, the Union argues that the Provost

violated that portion of Article 13 which states that "personnel
recommendations and decisions shall be made only after a review
of all of the qualifications and all of the contributions of an
individual in the areas of....research, creative or professional
activity...." It is clear, the Union asserts, that in his memorandi m
of May 21, 1981 the Provost exclusively reviewed the published,
Munter catalogue.

The contract mandates that the Provost should

have reviewed other legitimate contributions of the grievant in
this area of endeavor.

More specifically, the Union points to the

following contributions, all of which were noted in the tenure
file but none of which were expressly addressed in the Provost's
memorandum: (1) the extensive scholarly, research and organization
al efforts which were required in developing, funding, organizing
and curating the Munter exhibitions; (2) the planning of and
participation in a symposium at Harvard on Woman Artists in Early
Twentieth Century Germany which was offered in connection with
the Munter exhibition; (3) the preparation and delivery of a
paper at Temple University in 1974 on The Tradition of Plein-Air
Painting in Munich, 1880-1900; (4) the preparation and delivery
of a paper at the College Art Association Annual Meeting in 1977,
entitled: Gabriele Munter and the Blaue-Reiter; (5) the grievant's
dissertation; (6) an exhibition of artists co-organized by grievant for the University Art Gallery in 1973; and (7) the participation during 1975 and 1976 in various symposia and lectures on
topics relating to contemporary women's art.

In addition, the

-12Union contends that the Provost wrongly failed to consider the
major importance and impact of the entire Munter project.
Second, the Union asserts that the Provost violated that
portion of Article 13 which deals with the various areas to be
evaluated, that "The relative weight to be given to each may be
determined in light of the duties of each faculty member."

The

Union argues that the Provost should have given less weight to
the grievant's performance in the area of scholarship in light of
her very heavy teaching load.
Third, the Union contends that the Provost's actions in
this case violated Article 13.2 which provides that the Universityfs
"current academic standards and criteria for faculty personnel
actions.... shall remain in effect for the duration of the Agreemenj:."
The Union points to the fact that Dean Allen who had also served
as Acting Provost, was in favor of awarding tenure and the fact
that none of the witnesses could recall a negative tenure decision
by the Provost in light of unanimous affirmative recommendations
from all of the various faculty committees, the Department Chairman and the Dean.

Thus, the Union concludes that the Provost

changed the relevant criteria for tenure.
Lastly, the Union asserts that the Provost violated Article
11.1 in that he reversed the faculty recommendation in favor of
the grievant even though

there existed no "exceptional circum-

stances" or "compelling reasons in written detail which shall
specifically address the content of (the faculty's) recommendation
as well as established standards and criteria."

However, the

Union concedes, based upon prior arbitration decisions under this

-13contract, that this Arbitrator has a limited review of the validity
of the Provost's actions.

More specifically, the Union accepts

the standard articulated by Arbitrator Dorr:
"....the arbitrator literally may not substitute his judgment of a candidate's
qualifications for that of the administration but must be open to the Union evidence
that the administrator:
In exercising his judgment was arbitrary,
capricious or acting in bad faith, or
Neglected to write out his reasons in
detail addressing the content of the
original recommendation as well as the
established standards and criteria to
be found in Red Book 4-9 and 4.2."
Nevertheless, the Union contends that the Provost violated Article
11.1 in that he was arbitrary and capricious in recommending
against grievant's tenure.

The Union bases this assertion on the

Provost's decision to review only the Hunter catalogue; his failure
to address or give weight to all of the favorable letters from
outside evaluators; and his quoting other such letters "out of
context."
The Union concedes, based upon a prior arbitration award,
that this Arbitrator cannot actually award tenure.

Accordingly,

it requests that the grievant be reinstated with back pay and
interest and that her

tenure candidacy^"4 be re-evaluated in

compliance with the contractual standards.

14. I assume that the Union is also requesting a re-evaluation
of the grievant's promotion to Associate Professor.

-14THE UNIVERSITY
The University contends that the Provost's decision to
deny

tenure to the grievant was in compliance with all provisions

of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.

More

specifically, the University asserts that the Provost did in fact
review all of the qualifications and all of the contributions of
the grievant in accordance with the requirements of Article 13.1.
It notes that the Provost testified that he read and made his
decision based upon the entire tenure

dossier and that the Provost

never placed any limitations on what he would consider as evidence
under the category of research, creative or professional activity.
Although in his May 21 memorandum, the Provost focused on the
Munter catalogue as the "primary evidence of scholarship," this
does not mean that he failed to review anything else.

He simply

attributed less weight to other evidence.
Further, the University vigorously resists the Union's
contention that the Provost violated Article 13.1 by failing to
give less weight to the grievant's scholarship in light of her
heavy teaching load.

The University relies on the grievant's own

testimony during these hearings that she did not take the position
that "because of (her) teaching or service activities.... the
requirements of strength in research, creative or professional
activities should have been lowered in regard to (her)..." or
that any "allowances should have been made in regard to quantity
of..„.accomplishments in research creative or professional activit _es
because of.... teaching or service activities." Indeed, throughout
her career at the University, the grievant was made aware of the

-15fact that she was expected to meet the usual criteria in this
area and that she ought not to allow other activities to unduly
hamper her scholarly development.

The University also contends

that the Provost's undisputed testimony establishes a University
policy requiring that any re-allocation of "relative weight" pursuant to Article 13.1 be done by prior written agreement with the
Provost.

No such agreement exists in the instant case.

In addition, the University argues that the Provost's action
did not amount to any change or alteration of tenure standards
which might possibly be in violation of Article 13.2.

The

University contends that the Union presented no evidence to support
its claim in this regard, other than the mere fact that Dean Allen
testified that if he were Provost, he would have decided the
instant case in favor of the grievant.

The University asserts

that the exercise of discretion by the Provost in rendering his
academic judgment of the quality and quantity of the candidate's
work does not amount to an alteration of standards even if someone
else would have decided the case differently in the past.
Lastly, the Unviersity contends that the Provost did not
violate Article 11.1 in reversing the prior faculty recommendation
because there existed "exceptional circumstances" and the Provost
set forth "compelling reasons in written detail" for doing so.
The University emphasizes that there is no contract violation since!,

15. The Provost testified that he did not know whether this
"policy existed when the grievant was appointed as an Assistant
professor in 1974.
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at the very least, the Provost was not arbitrary, capricious or
in bad faith in concluding that his decision, based upon an
evidence in the tenure file, differed from that of the original
faculty recommendation.

The University asserts that the Provost's

decision in the instant case was based upon his reasonable conclusion that the primary evidence of research, creative or professional activity was the Munter catalogue; that he appropriately
judged it not of sufficient significance or quality to outweigh
an overall skeletal record; and that there was no other evidence
to warrant a finding of strength.

The Provost's conclusion was

based upon his independent assessment of the catalogue, as well
as a close reading of the letters of recommendation, some of which
supported his negative conclusion, and none of which provided the
detailed analyses, dissection and substantive evaluation which
would have aided him in reaching a different judgment on the
quality of the catalogue.

Instead, the favorable letters of

outsider evaluators contained mere conclusions or general descriptions tending to characterize the catalogue in glowing terms.
Indeed, one letter criticized the content of the catalogue.
Nor did the Provost limit his considerations to the Munter
catalogue.

Rather, he reviewed the "record in its entirety,"

16. The Gordon letter states in part: "There is weakness in
Mochon's study, admittedly. This is her excessive caution in
relating Munter's art to the broader tendencies of German
Expressionism. Thus she misses the fascinating parallel of the
Munter Girl With Doll of 1908-09 with woodcuts from 1910 by
Heckeland Kirchner and, perhaps more seriously, the probable
dependence of Munter's 1907 Bridge in Chartres on woodcuts by
Kirchner and Bleye....More generally, she does not go into the
general issue of naivete or primitivism in turn of the century
German art....nor does she examine some of the reasons for the
abstraction in the background in the 1906 Portrait of Kandinsky."

-17including such of grievant's activities as the development and
organization of the Munter exhibitions and other art exhibitions,
participation in symposia, preparation and delivery of lectures,
and preparation and delivery of papers to professional groups.
Nevertheless, the Provost was unable to find that these contributions constituted convincing evidence of strength in scholarly
work because the tenure

file did not contain copies of the texts

of the lectures, or papers or substantive information or evaluations relating to most of these activities.

Those evaluations

which did discuss one or more of these contributions were conelusory rather than substantive and detailed.

Further, any

d eficiency in the evidence in the tenure file was the responsibili •y
of the grievant or the faculty or the outside evaluators and not
of the Provost.

Section 6.4 (b) of the Academic Personnel Policy

provides that "a faculty member shall submit to the Department
Head any and all materials, for inclusion in the basic file, which
he or she believes will be essential to an adequate consideration
of the case."

Section 3.1 provides that "The faculty has the

obligation to present a clear, complete and convincing case for
the recommendation so as to assure the faculty member of a complet
presentation of his or her qualifications and achievements and so
as to provide the basis both for full reviews of the recommendatioi
and the decision.

Lastly, the letter sent by the Department Chair--

person to outside evaluators stated in part: "if you would be
willing to supply us with your evaluation of Dr. Mochon's scholarl]
contributions and the impact of her work on her area of speciality
Also your opinion as to Dr. Mochon's standing in comparison with
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other scholars of her age and speciality would be of use to us."
The word "evaluation" should have implied the kind of detailed
analytical underpinnings which was sought by the Provost.
OPINION
The Union has not satisfied its burden of proving that the
Provost's action in this case constituted a violation of Article
13 of the collective bargaining agreement.

First, the Union has

not established that the Provost failed to "review" all of the
qualifications and all of the contributions of the grievant in
the area of research, creative or professional activity.

Although

the Provost's memorandum of May 21, 1981 focuses almost exclusively on the Munter catalogue, it does make some reference to "the
total record before us" and of "a careful and thorough review of
the basic file in its original form, the various recommendations
accompanying it, the responses provided to Provost Baritz's
memorandum to Dean Allen pursuant to Section 6.4 (g) of the
Academic Personnel Policy...." In addition, the Provost's unimpeached and uncontradicted testimony in this proceeding
establishes that he did review and consider all of the grievant's
qualifications and contributions.

That is not to say that the

Provost necessarily accorded those contributions appropriate
weight in recommending against tenure.

Indeed, that is one of

the Union's strongest arguments in its claim of violation of
Article 11.

But Article 13 is designed to ensure that the

decision maker "reviews" all of the relevant matter; it does not
purport to assign any weight to that information.
Second, I am not persuaded that the Provost violated Article

-1913.1 by his failure to give less weight to grievant's contribution:
in the area of research, creative or professional activity because
of her heavy teaching load.

The contract language itself is

permissive, i.e. it states that the "relative weight to be given
to each may be determined in the light of the duties of the
faculty member." Indeed, requiring excellence in only two of the
areas, but only strength in the third may support the exercise of
the discretion accorded to decision-makers by the language of
Article 13.1. Most importantly, the evidence in this proceeding
clearly establishes that the grievant did not expect the application of anything less than the normal requirements relating to
quality and quantity of scholarship, even though she had an
unusually heavy teaching load.
Third, the Union has not satisfied its burden of proving
that the Provost violated Article 13.2 by setting a new and
higher criteria for reviewing scholarly work.

The Union introduce

no evidence tending to show that other tenure candidates who were
similary situated to the grievant with respect to the nature,
quality and quantity research, creative or professional activity,
were granted tenure in past years through the application of
different criteria.

The mere fact that a new Provost, who purport

to apply the established criteria, reaches a decision which is
different from that which would have been reached by a prior

17. Thus, I make no finding as to whether a prior written agreement signed by the Provost is a pre-requisite to altering the usua
distribution of weight among those areas.
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Provost, does not prove that the criteria has been changed.

To

decide otherwise, would prevent a new academic administrator from
exercising independent judgment in the application of the criteria
even if the evaluative result is different from that of his
predecessors.

I cannot conclude that the parties intended to

foreclose that new and independent judgment under the language in
Article 13.2.
negative tenure

Nor does the fact that no witnesses could recall a
decision by the Provost in light of unanimous,

affirmative recommendations from all of the various faculty
committees, department chairmen and the Dean, satisfy the Union's
burden of establishing that the Provost used different "criteria"
than were used in the past. 1 R
The remaining issue is whether the Provost's action in
recommending against grievant and contrary to the prior faculty
recommendations constituted a violation of Article 11.1.

The

express language of that provision, as well as the fact that
Article 11.2 specifically grants to faculty the right to grieve
such administrative actions, would appear to place the burden on
the University to establish that there existed "exceptional
circumstances" and "compelling reasons" to support the Provost's
decision.

Yet, as noted previously, the Union, as well as the

University, have taken the position that this Arbitrator may find

18. Thus, I make no finding as to the relationship between Artid
13.2 and that part of 13.1 which requires that "high professional
standards must be the basis for all personnel decisions."

-21a violation of Article 11.1 only if the Union has persuaded him
that the Provost acted in bad faith or was arbitrary or capricious
The Union's concession of this limited standard of review is based
upon the decisions in prior arbitration awards under this contract
language.
The source of this restrictive interpretation of Article
11.1 is the opinion of Arbitrator Dorr in the Cleveland case.
There, the arbitrator concluded:
"Thus, absent a showing that an administrator
was arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith, a
reversal of the original faculty recommendation
on the grounds that the contents of the dossier
do not support such recommendation, may be considered contractually an 'exceptional circumstance which, if accompanied in written detail
addressing the 'content* of the original
recommendation as well as 'established standards
and criteria,' may also constitute 'compelling
reasons ' ....
....the arbitrator may not substitute his judgment on a candidate's qualifications for that
of the Administration but must be open to Union
evidence that the Administrator:
in exercising his judgment was arbitrary,
capricious or acting in bad faith, or
neglected to write out his reasons in
written detail addressing the content of
the original recommendation as well as the
established standards and criteria to be
found in Red Book 4.9 and 4.2."
Arguably, Arbitrator Stutz followed this interpretation in the
Gengel arbitration.

He stated that "whether (the dean's) reasons

for disagreeing with the faculty recommendations were compelling
is a matter of academic judgment," and that the "good faith conclusions of an administrator, based on evidence in the dossier,
that his or her recommendation differs from that of the department
is contractually, in and of itself, an exceptional circumstance."
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However, Arbitrator Stutz does require in addition that "compelling
reasons (be) indicated in writing."

He also notes that Article

11.1 has not "bestowed unfettered discretion" upon the administrator.

Thus it is not crystal clear that Arbitrator Stutz adopted

all of Arbitrator Dorr's reading of Article 11.1. °
Arbitrator Dorr's interpretation of Article 11.1 is based
upon "common usage" and Section 4.3 of the collective bargaining
agreement which provides : "The judgment of an arbitrator shall not
be substituted for that of the employer with regard to any complaints or grievance based upon a challenge of a management right,
subject to the provisions of this Agreement...."
This Arbitrator does not agree with Dorr.

Obviously, Sectioi

11.1 is designed to limit "management rights" when a personnel
decision is made contrary to the original faculty recommendation.
In my view "exceptional circumstances" and "compelling reasons"
are not synonymous with arbitrariness or capricicousness.

It is

well settled that the "arbitrary or capricious" standards of
review would be implied even if there were no express contractual
language limiting management's power.

Thus, under the contract

language there is a presumption in favor of affirmation of the

19. Arbitrator Zack's decision in the Lloyd arbitration does not
expressly support or reject the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review. He held only that an arbitrator may not actually grant
tenure as a remedy. Zack stated that: "The Arbitrator has the contractual right to require adherence to the agreed upon standards for
review in tenure cases and to enforce those standards with remedies
other than the award of tenure....The Arbitrator.... for example,
may be asked to determine whether... there were in fact "exceptional
circumstances and with compelling reasons" (Zack at page 28). In
the most recent arbitration between these parties involving Article
11.1, Arbitrator Nadworny undertakes an independent review of an
administrator's decision to determine whether there were "tangible
reasonable and objective reasons for disagreeing with a departmental
recommendation."

-23facuity recommendation, rebuttable only in "exceptional circumstances" and for "compelling reasons,"

And the validity of the

University's reliance on these latter circumstances is fully
reviewable in arbitration.

Arbitrator Dorr's standard of review

makes meaningless the explicit requirements in Article 11.1 that
there exist "exceptional circumstances" and "compelling reasons."
Despite the above reasoning, I am constrained to apply
Arbitrator Dorr's standard of review in this proceeding.

That is

so because the Union specifically conceded the applicability of
that standard. 20

While the Union's concession was apparently

based upon its erroneous belief that this Arbitrator is bound by
the prior arbitration decisions, it would be unfair to the University
to apply a different standard without fair notice and full opportunity for argument.

Thus the issue in this arbitration narrows

to whether the Union has satisfied its burden of proving that the
Provost was arbitrary in finding that there existed "exceptional"
and "compelling reasons" sufficient to reverse the prior unanimous
faculty recommendations to grant the grievant tenure.
A careful and thorough review of the testimony, documents
and arguments submitted in this proceeding has persuaded me that
the Provost acted in an arbitrary manner in concluding that
"compelling reasons" existed to disregard the affirmative faculty
votes.

20. But for that concession I would have followed my interpretation
of the contract.
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In his testimony in these hearings, the Provost emphasized
that in looking for a "record of continuing development such as
would lead to a reasonable assurance of future continued productivity" and in judging "the quality of the work that has been done
to date," he is dependent upon the "substantive evaluations that
were in the dossier as it comes" to him.

Thus he testified that

published work is the "best kind of evidence" because it provides
the "opportunity to have critical analysis by peers who are external to the campus" and that he is "dependent on the evaluation
of others to a degree." And, in his memorandum of May 21, 1981,
the Provost's judgment of lack of strength is based, in part, on
"a close reading of the letters of recommendation."
The Provost also testified that he believed there were
"many other vehicles for expression of either research, profession
al or creative activity that are equally acceptable," as they also
could well result in the kind of evaluation by peers which he
sought.

Thus, the Provost included as relevant contributions,

invited lectureships, art history exhibits and curatorships, and
some kinds of participation in symposia or panels."
however, that the tenure

He concluded,

dossier of the grievant did not provide

convincing evidence of strength in these areas.
Specifically, with respect to the Hunter catalogue, the
Provost's conclusion is based largely upon what he characterized
as the "conclusory nature" of the outside evaluations.
Also, the Provost stated that he was unable to find convincing
evidence of strength with respect to the grievant's curatorship
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of the Munter exhibit and participation in the accompanying

I
symposia because the letters of evaluation which praised the
grievant's efforts in these areas did not include enough detailed
dissection of the work and its impact.

And further, he testified

that although he was aware that the grievant had delivered two
papers to professional organizations, he could not find therein
any additional evidence of strength because the file did not
contain peer reviews or even copies of the texts.
In short, the Provost's own testimony establishes that the
critical element in his decision was the lack of sufficient
factual underpinnings and dissection to support the favorable
evaluations contained in the tenure file.
The Provost's arbitrariness, in my view, is found in his
selective use of the statements of the outside evaluators; his
failure to accord the opinions of the outside evaluators the
professional respect and credibility generally given recognized
experts; and his failure to give fair and explicit notice to the
grievant, the faculty, the Dean, the Department Chairperson or
even the outside evaluators of what he perceived to be inadequacies
in those evaluations and in the other aspects of the grievant's
file.
Unevenhandedly, in my view, he relied on the "conclusory"
language of the letters as to the quantity of the publications,
but rejected conclusory statements on quality.

For example he

used the negative conclusions in the letters of Dr. Comini,
Professors Franciscono and Herbert regarding quantity in support
of his negative decision, but apparently did not give equal

-26consideration to the positive conclusions as to quality in those
same letters.
Dr. Comini states: "As to the brevity of Dr. Mochon's use
of publications, her Munter Catalog makes up admirably for this
"publish or perish" shortcoming.

It has carried her far afield

of her original dissertation topic and the scrupulous integrity
and interesting scope of her approach shines out from every page
of the publication, making it a pleasure to consult and a model
of how devotion to subject can be tempered by even keeled
methodology."

Professor Franciscono states in part: "Dr. Mochon's

Munter Catalog is, in my opinion, an exceptionally fine introduction to the work of an artist too little known.

I was impressed

by Dr. Mochon's clear, thoughtful and convincing evaluations...."
And Professor Herbert noted that "the Munter Catalog, is a really
first-rate monograph, and alone is proof of (Dr. Mochon's)
perceptions (as well as her hard work)....The Munter Catalog

is

full of facts, interpretations and ideas that are entirely new
to me."

Even the Gordon letter, discussed in footnote 16, supra,

ultimately concluded that "Mochon's approach is consonant with
the best that is being done by young American scholars in the
field today" and that he would recommend the grievant for promotion "anywhere where careful and thorough scholarship in twentieth
century German art is respect."

The fact is that all the letters

of the outside evaluators contained praise for her work.
All faculty committees, as well as the Dean, the Chair and
the grievant reasonably believed that the outside evaluations in

-27the file constituted convincing evidence of strength since the
evaluators were recognized experts in the field of art history.
The letter soliciting outside reviews asked for an "evaluation
of Dr. Mochon's scholarly contributions...." as well as an "opinion
as to Dr. Mochon's standing in comparison with other scholars."
(emphasis added).
were "conclusory."

It is not at all surprising that their responses
In my view, as experts, their evaluations

and opinions should be presumptively acceptable and persuasive,
even if interpreted,as conclusory.

If the Provost thought he

required more detailed delineation supporting those conclusions
he should have specifically requested the desired information. 9 n
His request of March 3, 1981 to Dean Allen for additional information was not adequate.

Although that document referred to

"internal or external analyses of the material," it did not
reasonably indicate the "deficiency" of the analyses already
submitted or those additional analyses submitted thereafter.
It would have been both fair and simple for the Provost to have
specified in that March 3, 1981 request the nature of the information which was missing and thereby

afford the grievant a reasonon
able opportunity to supply the "shortcoming."
By not doing that,

20. Similarly, the Provost should have requested evaluations
and/or copies of those of grievant's contributions which were
only referred to by way of reference in the tenure file.
21. Sec. 5.1(a) of the Academic Personnel Policy gives faculty
members the "opportunity to supplement the original presentation
with additional relevant information in the event that a review
indicates shortcomings in the presentation."
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the grievant, and those supporting her, had no way of knowing
that the Provost wanted something different or more than what
is traditionally submitted by outside experts.

Nor should the

Provost be relieved from his obligation in this regard because
of Sections 3.1 and 5.1 (a) of the Academic Personnel Policy
of the University.

The Provost does not have an obligation to

create a complete and convincing tenure file.

He must, however,

and to avoid arbitrariness, give fair notice of what he believes
to be a relevant deficiency with respect to the lack of detailed
22
information relating to the material already included in the file.
For the foregoing reasons, I find the Provost acted
arbitrarily in his evaluation of the grievant's tenure file and
credentials, in violation of Article 11 of the contract.

22. Although the Cleveland, Gengel and Edwards arbitrations
were decided in favor of the University, none of them turned
upon the lack of fair notice of insufficient detail in favorable
outside evaluations by recognized experts. In addition, those
cases are otherwise distinguishable in significant respects.
For example, in Cleveland, the grievant hadn't published at all
since he completed his dissertation; the Collegiate Personnel
Committee split 3-3 on whether to recommend tenure; and, the
Dean found that the Department Personnel Committee based its
rating of excellence in teaching on an insufficient sampling of
student evaluations. In Gengel, the school personnel committee
first voted against recommending tenure and then changed its
view, but by a non-unanimous vote. In addition, the employee's
only contribution in the area of scholarly work since joining the
University was one co-authored article, one book review, one
paper in conference proceedings and a chapter in a book of essays
honoring one of the leaders in the area of speech and hearing.
In Edwards, which did not involve tenure, the administrator's
decision was upheld on the basis of reasonable concerns over
budgetary and staffing problems.

-29The Union accepts the Lloyd decision which bars an arbitrator from awarding tenure.

I do not choose to disregard or

go beyond that decision, especially in view of the Union's
concession on the matter of remedy.

Clearly, Lloyd is not

palpably wrong, the standard upon which arbitrators in subsequent cases reverse prior decisions in point.
Therefore, and accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The University violated Article 11 of the
collective bargaining agreement by the
manner in which the Provost reversed the
original faculty recommendation, thereby
denying tenure to Dr. Anne Mochon. Dr.
Mochon shall be reinstated for the 1983/
84 academic year. She shall receive a de
novo re-evaluation of her tenure and promotion candidacy in accordance with the contractual criteria and procedures. She shall
receive back pay from the termination of her
employment on August 31, 1982 to the date of
her reinstatement, less her earnings, if any
from gainful employment during that period.
The request for interest on the back pay is
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 30, 1983
STATE OF NEW YORK )
' oO
COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

•In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Truck Drivers Local Union #807 IBT
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/20246
2-CA-19180

Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the following arbitrable?
Has the Employer failed to comply with
its 1977-1980 collective bargaining
agreement by failing to pay the total
sum of $11,823.13 in pension contributions on behalf of those employees reduced to auxiliary status in January
and April 1978? If so what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held in New York City on January 7 and March
17, 1983 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offe
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides were afforded an

opportunity to file a post-hearing brief.

The Employer filed

a brief.
I find the grievance time barred from arbitration and hence
not arbitrable.
Section C of the Grievance Procedure of the contract provides in pertinent part:
1) In the event the grievance is not settled
in Step 2, either the Employer or the Union
may notify the other in writing within ten
(10) days of its intent to submit the grievance to arbitration.
2) Any extensions to the time limit set forth
in this Article must be by mutual agreement
between both parties.
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I conclude that the intent and effect of paragraphs 1 and
2 above are to make the ten day time limit to submit a grievance
to arbitration mandatory and a statute of limitations.
With regard to the instant grievance, the Union did not
comply with that time limit and there is no evidence in the
record that the time limit was extended or waived, either in
this situation or generally.
I find, as the Employer asserts, that the subject matter
of the instant grievance was presented to Arbitrator Burton B.
Turkus in September 1980.

Turkus, who had previously ruled in

November 1978 that the Employer had improperly classified a
number of employees, stated in his second decision, in response
to the Union's claim that the Employer failed to make pension
contributions on behalf of those employees previously found to
1
be improperly classified that he was "functus officio." He
further stated that "if these... claims...

are arbitrable...

they must be raised and brought to arbitration in another and
entirely independent proceeding."
With the forgoing ruling, Turkus gave the Union the opportunity de novo to submit to arbitration on the instant pension
issue, over which he determined he had not retained jurisdiction.
I conclude that that opportunity triggered the commencement of
the mandatory ten day period under the contract for the referral
of a grievance to arbitration.

In short, Turkus1 ruling of

1. Said pension claim is the issue in the instant

arbitration.

-3November 20, 1980 constituted a constructive application and
completion of the forgoing parts of the grievance procedure,
setting the ten day time limit in motion.
The Union's notice of its intent to arbitrate was submitted
almost a year later, by a Notice to the New York State Supreme
Court, with service on the Employer.

The Employer opposed the

Notice on the grounds that the dispute was time barred.

The

Court referred the case, including the threshold issue of
arbitrability to arbitration.
The forgoing facts show that the Union failed to comply
with the contract time limit;

that the Employer did not extend

or waive the time limit, and did not acquiesce in the procedure
followed by the Union.

Having found the time limit to be

mandatorily prescribed, I must conclude

that the present

grievance is no longer arbitrable.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's claim that the Employer failed
to comply with its 1977-1980 collective
bargaining agreement by failing to pay the
total sum of $11,823.13 in pension contributions on behalf of those employees reduced
to auxiliary status in January and April 1978,
is not arbitrable.

DATED: May 31, 1983
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )s''

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Truck Drivers Local Union #807 IBT
OPINION

AND

AWARD

Case #82K/20246
2-CA-19180

and

Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the following arbitrable?
Has the Employer failed to comply with
its 1977-1980 collective bargaining
agreement by failing to pay the total
sum of $11,823.13 in pension contributions on behalf of those employees reduced to auxiliary status in January
and April 1978? If so what: shall be the
remedy?

i

Hearings were held in New York City on January 7 and March
17, 1983 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides were afforded an
;

opportunity to file a post-hearing brief.

The Employer filed

a brief.

I find the grievance time barred from arbitration and hence
not arbitrable.
Section C of the Grievance Procedure of the contract provides in pertinent part:
1) In the event the grievance is not settled
in Step 2, either the Employer or the Union
may notify the other in writing within ten
(10) days of its intent to submit the grievance to arbitration.
2) Any extensions to the time limit set forth
in this Article must be by mutual agreement
between both parties.
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I conclude that the intent and effect of paragraphs 1 and
2 above are to make the ten day time limit to submit a grievance
to arbitration mandatory and a statute of limitations.
With regard to the instant grievance, the Union did not
comply with that time limit and there is no evidence in the
record that the time limit was extended or waived, either in
this situation or generally.
I find, as the Employer asserts, that the subject matter
of the instant grievance was presented to Arbitrator Burton B.
Turkus in September 1980.

Turkus, who had previously ruled in

November 1978 that the Employer had improperly classified a
number of employees, stated in his second decision, in response
to the Union's claim that the Employer failed to make pension
contributions on behalf of those employees previously found to
1
be improperly classified that he was "functus officio." He
further stated that "if these... claims...

are arbitrable...

they must be raised and brought to arbitration in another and
entirely independent proceeding."
With the forgoing ruling, Turkus gave the Union the opportunity de novo to submit to arbitration on the instant pension
issue, over which he determined he had not retained jurisdiction.
I conclude that that opportunity triggered the commencement of
the mandatory ten day period under the contract for the referral
of a grievance to arbitration.

In short, Turkus' ruling of

1. Said pension claim is the issue in the instant arbitration.

-3November 20, 1980 constituted a constructive application and
completion of the forgoing parts of the grievance procedure,
setting the ten day time limit in motion.
The Union's notice of its intent to arbitrate was submitted
almost a year later, by a Notice to the New York State Supreme
Court, with service on the Employer.

The Employer opposed the

Notice on the grounds that the dispute was time barred.

The '

Court referred the case, including the threshold issue of
arbitrability to arbitration.
The forgoing facts show that the Union failed to comply
with the contract time limit;

I

that the Employer did not extend
i

or waive the time limit, and did not acquiesce in the procedure
followed by the Union.

Having found the time limit to be

mandatorily prescribed, I must conclude

that the present

grievance is no longer arbitrable.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's claim that the Employer failed
to comply with its 1977-1980 collective
bargaining agreement by failing to pay the
total sum of $11,823.13 in pension contributions on behalf of those employees reduced
to auxiliary status in January and April 1978,
is not arbitrable.

DATED: May 31, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, System Local 537

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #55 30 0178 82

and
Western Pennsylvania Water Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the grievant Ronald Foil continued to qualify for a leave of absence
under Section 25 of the 1979-82 contract
after his term of office as Vice-President of Local 537 ceased?
A hearing was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on
February 18, 1983 at which time Mr. Foil, hereinafter referred
to as the grievant, and representatives of the above named Union
and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexaminte witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both

sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The pertinent part of Section 25 reads:
LEAVE OF ABSENCE FOR UNION BUSINESS
A Union officer shall be granted a leave
of absence without pay for the purpose of
carrying on union business for the duration
of this Agreement, provided he has been
appointed or elected to a full time position
with the Union. This leave of absence shall
be renewable automatically upon the execution
of a new contract for the term of that contract. Such employee shall retain, but not
accumulate seniority during the period of
such leave.
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The Union claims that to qualify for the leave of absence,
an employee need only be a "Union officer" at the time that the
leave of absence is applied for and granted, but that the leave
continues thereafter so long as the employee serves in an appointed or elected full-time position with the Union.

In the instant

case the grievant was both the Vice-President of the Union and
an appointed full-time business agent when his leave of absence
was granted.

Sometime thereafter his term as Vice-President

ended but ha continued as the business agent.

At that point the

Employer terminated his leave of absence and directed him to
return to work.
The Employer's position is that throughout the leave of
absence the employee must be a Union officer and also be appointed or elected to a full-time position with the Union.
claims that when the grievant

The Company

ended his term as Vice-President,

his eligibility for a continued leave of absence ended, despite
the fact that he continued to serve as an appointed business
agent.
Manifestly Section 25 is ambiguous.
bly it can be interpreted either way.

Logically and plausi-

It could mean that the

employee need only be a Union officer when granted the leave of
absence, and thereafter retained eligibility for the leave, as
in the case with the grievant, if he continued to serve in an
appointed or elected full-time position with the Union.

Or, as

the Employer contends, it could mean that to be eligible for a
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leave of absence an employee must be a Union officer who has been
appointed or elected to a full-time position with the Union; whose
officership as well as his appointed or elected position continues throughout the leave of absence; and that if any of these
capacities no longer obtain, the leave of absence comes to an end
Ambiguities in contract language are traditionally clarified by resort to past practice and/or to the history of the
negotiation of that language.
produces probative evidence.

In the instant case neither method
There has been no past practice;

apparently this case is one of first impression.

The only evidence

regarding the negotiation of the critical language of Section 25
was testimony by a single Employer witness and it supported the
Employer's interpretation.
In this type of grievance the burden is on the grieving
party, namely the Union, to prove its case convincingly and by
substantial evidence.

In view of the evidentiary inadequacy,

that burden has not been met.

Therefore the grievance fails,

and clarification of the inherent ambiguity of Section 25 remains
a matter for collective bargaining and not for arbitration.
However, I conclude that the grievant and the Union on
his behalf had reasonable grounds to interpret Section 25 as they
did and that they believed in good faith that the grievant had
the right to continue his leave of absence.

Though that position

is not sustained in this arbitration, I think it harsh and unfair!
for the grievant to lose his job on the theory that he "quit"
when he did not return to work upon notice from the Employer
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that his leave of absence was ended.

He should be given the

opportunity, within one week from receipt of this decision,
to return to his employment with the Employer.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union has not met its burden of
proving that the grievant Ronald
Foil continued to qualify for a leave
of absence under Section 25 of the
1979-82 contract after his term of
office as Vice-President of Local 537
ceased.
However, the Employer's determination
that he "quit" is reversed. Mr. Foil
shall have one week from the date of
receipt of this Award to return to his
employment with the Employer.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 9, 1983
STATE OF New York)sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

